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Introduction  
Ghana became the first country in sub-Saharan Africa to attain 
political independence from Britain in 1957. Since then, it has 
experienced a chequered political history with power alternating 
between military and civilian governments till 1992.  It has gone 
through four successful military rules,2 several attempted coups 
d’état and three transitions.3 In all these instances, especially 
                                                 
1 Dr. Joanna Quinn, Dr. A.A. Apusiga and Dr. Hardi Bolaji provided valuable 
comments on an earlier draft of this manuscript. We are also grateful to the 
anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and recommendations.  
2 The National Liberation Council under A.A. Afrifa (24/02/1966 to 
30/09/1969); the National Redemption Council and the Supreme Military 
Council I &II under I.K. Achaempong and F.W. K Akuffo (13/01/1972 to 
03/06/1979); the  Armed Forces Revolutionary Council under J.J. Rawlings 
(04/06/1979 to 23/09/1979); and the Provisional National Defence Council 
also under J.J. Rawlings (31/12/1981 to 06/01/1993).   
3 From the National Liberation Council military regime to the democratic 
government of Prime Minister K.A. Busia ushering in Ghana’s Second 
Republic; from the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council military regime to 
the democratic government of Dr. Hilla Limann marking the beginning of 
the Third Republic, and from the Provisional National Defence Council 
1
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during the military regimes, grave human rights abuses were 
believed to have been committed, including rape, confiscation of 
properties, unlawful detentions, torture and widespread 
disappearances.4  These violations have not only left a mark of 
hatred in the relationship between victims and perpetrators of 
the crimes but have also created huge deficits in the human 
rights records of the country.  
 The decision of the Provisional National Defence 
Council (PNDC) regime to return the country to constitutional 
rule in 1992 was influenced to some extent by the dedication 
and resourcefulness of civil society organizations.5  Indeed, the 
role of civil society organizations in policy making in Ghana has 
developed gradually from insignificant involvement to extensive 
engagement over the last two decades.6  This pattern of 
development is similar to what happened at the international 
level where Moore and Pubantz7  have argued that it was not till 
the 1980s that the United Nations saw an explosion in the 
quantity and quality of NGOs.8  In this spirit, the Ghana Bar 
Association, religious bodies and other civil society 
organizations have all worked relentlessly in ensuring that Ghana 
did not only return to democratic rule but have also initiated 
measures aimed at reconciling the nation through the granting of 
                                                                                                      
military rule to the democratic government of Flight Lieutenant Jerry John 
Rawlings signifying the beginning of the Fourth Republic. 
4 Robert Ameh, “Uncovering Truth: Ghana’s National Reconciliation 
Commission Excavation of Past Human Rights Abuses,” Contemporary Justice 
Review 9.4 (2006): 345-368. 
5 Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi, “Civil Society in Africa: the Good, the Bad, the 
Ugly,” CIVNET, 1.1 (May 1997). 
6 AbdulGafaru Abdulai and , Ruby Quantson “The Changing role of CSOs 
in Public Policy making in Ghana,” Ghana Social Science Journal, 5/6.1/2 
(1999): 114-151. 
7 John A. Moore and Jerry Pubantz, The New United Nations: International 
Organization in the Twenty-First Century (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson 
Education Inc./Prentice Hall, 2006). 
8 In Ghana, the introduction of the 1992 Constitution and return to 
constitutional rule led to the proliferation of civil society organizations in the 
1990s. 
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amnesties to Ghanaian exiles, the release of political prisoners 
and the repealing of draconian laws in the country.9  After the 
transition to democracy, civil society groups also played an 
active role in monitoring government policies, providing services 
and consolidating the little gained in the country’s democratic 
dispensation through advocacy work. Therefore the role civil 
society organizations played in the work of the National 
Reconciliation Commission (NRC) came as no surprise from the 
time the idea was introduced into the political discourse of the 
country until the time the Commission completed its work and 
even beyond.10 The Civil Society Coalition on National 
Reconciliation was established to help actualize government’s 
commitment towards reconciliation via the platform of the 
NRC. While their formation is informed by variety of reasons, 
coalitions provide a lot of benefits to their members. Generally, 
civil society coalitions have increased access to information, 
expertise and financial resources which in turn enhance their 
level of efficiency and increase their operational impact.11  
 In terms of structure, coalitions can be formal or 
informal associations and may operate at different levels; from 
local to international.  There is no criterion on how and why 
networks develop but formation can be instigated by external or 
internal sources, or for practical or value-based reasons.12  
                                                 
9 H.J.A.N. Mensa-Bonsu, “Gender, Justice and Reconciliation: Lessons 
from the Ghana’s NRC,” Unpublished paper delivered at the CDD-CI 
Workshop on Gender, Justice and Reconciliation, at the Fiesta Royale 
Hotel, Accra, 7 June 2007. 
10 Prof. Mike Ocquaye, Second Deputy Speaker of Ghana’s Parliament, was 
the first person to introduce the concept of national reconciliation into 
Ghana’s academic and political discourse in his article, “M. Ocquaye, 
“Human Rights and the Transitional to Democracy under the PNDC in 
Ghana,” Human Rights Quarterly 17.3 (1995): 556-573. 
11 Seidu Alidu, “CSO Networks and Policy Influence in Ghana,” 
Research Report, ISSER-CIDIN Civil Society Research Facility Ghana, 
2012. 
12 Claudia Liebler and Marisa Ferri, “NGO Networks: Building Capacity in a 
Changing World,” Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation (November 
2004). 
3
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Depending on the issue that needs their attention, coalitions may 
be formed to be sustainable in the long run or as a response to a 
very specific stimulus and are designed to be time-bound.  The 
CDD-led Civil Society Coalition on National Reconciliation was 
a national one formed to influence the work of the Ghanaian 
TRC and was therefore time-bound. It consisted of twenty-six 
civil society organisations drawn largely but not exclusively from 
the media, the trade union, religious and other professional 
associations including teachers, lawyers, students and traditional 
leaders. It was chaired by a retired High Court Judge, Mr Justice 
V.C.R.A.C Crabbe. Largely drawn from different professional 
backgrounds, the Civil Society Coalition on National 
Reconciliation was able to work together throughout the NRC 
mandate period. Certainly, Weible argues that advocacy 
coalitions are able to hold on together and coordinate their 
activities through a belief system.13  The core belief that 
bounded these different organizations together was their desire 
to advance the course of human rights and reconciliation in the 
country.  
 Though there is no shortage of academic literature on 
the role of civil society organizations in policy making and 
international development, there is a dearth of information on 
the role of Ghanaian civic groups in the country’s reconciliation 
process. This paper aims at bridging that gap by assessing the 
contribution of the Civil Society Coalition to the formal 
Ghanaian national reconciliation process, which was set in 
motion when the National Reconciliation Act was passed in 
2002. In this vein, the paper seeks to answer the following 
questions: How did the Civil Society Coalition on National 
Reconciliation contribute to the work of the Ghana National 
Reconciliation Commission (NRC)?  How effective was the 
Coalition in advancing the goal of reconciliation in Ghana? What 
challenges did the Coalition encounter? What was the impact of 
                                                 
13 Christopher M. Weible, “Beliefs and Policy Influence: an Advocacy 
Coalition Approach to Policy Networks,” Political Research Quarterly, 58.3 
(2005): 461-477. 
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such participation to policy making in Ghana? This paper is 
based on the analysis of secondary data on both the work of 
transitional justice in general and the NRC in particular. It also 
draws a little from an interview with the former Program Officer 
in charge of the Transitional Justice Unit at the CDD which 
formed the Civil Society Coalition on National Reconciliation. 
The paper is broadly divided into four sections. Section one 
examines the Ghanaian transition from the perspective of Ní 
Aoláin and Campbell’s typology of “paradigmatic” and 
“conflicted democratic” transitions. 14  While the second section 
looks at the Ghanaian transitional justice programme, the third 
appraises the role of the Civil Society Coalition on National 
Reconciliation and its contribution to the transitional justice 
programme. The last section assesses the work of the Civil 
Society Coalition on National Reconciliation vis-à-vis the NRC 
and makes a recommendation for similar programmes in the 
future. 
 
The Ghanaian Transition 
Several literatures abound on democratic transitions. While 
majority of these focuses on the causes and outcomes of 
democratic transitions, others emphasize the pre-requisites for 
democratization including socio-economic development, 
political culture and the role of civil society in such process.15  
Guo discusses four major approaches to the study of democratic 
transitions: 16 the first assumes that economic development, 
political culture, social structures and other conditions explain 
the outcome of a particular transition; the second approach 
concentrates on the strategic choices that elites make  and how 
that influences the transitional process; the third approach 
focuses on the impact of institutions in determining the 
                                                 
14 Fionnuala Ní Aoláin and Christine Campbell, “The Paradox of Transition 
in Conflicted Democracies,” Human Rights Quarterly, 27 (2005): 172-213. 
15 Helga A. Welsh, “Political Transition Processes in Central and Eastern 
Europe,” Comparative Politics, 27.379 (1994): 379-394. 
16 Sujian Guo, “Democratic Transition: A Critical Overview,” Issues and 
Studies, 35.4 (July/August 1999): 133-148. 
5
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parameters of political actions and eventual transition, and the 
fourth approach emphasises the interaction between politics and 
the economy as explanatory variables determining variations in 
political outcomes.17 Similarly, many democratic transition 
theorists have all explained democratic transitions using the 
actor-induced model. 18  This model assumes that democratic 
transitions are inspired by strategies, beliefs and calculations of 
the ruling elites who spearhead the transition process at critical 
times in their rule. Such critical times may come about due to 
internal or external pressures or social, economic and political 
challenges. 
 Arguably, the Ghanaian democratic transition in the 
early nineties was influenced so much by the socio-economic 
dynamics of the country than any other factor.  The economic 
challenges the PNDC regime faced after its overthrow of the 
Peoples’ National Party in 1981 led to its adoption of a World 
Bank-initiated Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) to 
stabilize an ailing economy.19  Though the results of the World 
Bank-led SAP was mixed,20 a lot of analysts believed its social 
consequences was unbearable to the ordinary Ghanaian  
                                                 
17 Ibid., 135-137. 
18 See Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the late Twentieth 
Century, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).  See also Guillermo 
O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, “Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: 
Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies,” in Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule, eds. Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and 
Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1986). 
19 K. Boafo-Arthur, “Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPS) in Ghana: 
Interrogating PNDC’s Implementation,” West Africa Review, 1.1 (1999):  1-19;  
S. Appiah-Opoku, “The World’s Bank Structural Adjustment Programs in 
Africa: the case of Ghana,” Notes (Cornell University, 1998): 6-10; K. 
Konado-Agyemang, “The Best of Times and the Worst of Times: Structural 
Adjustment Programs and Uneven Development in Africa: the case of 
Ghana,” Professional Geographers, 52.3 (2000): 469-483. 
20 Boafo-Arthur, “Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPS) in Ghana,” 1-
19;  K. Boafo-Arthur, K. “Ghana’s Politics of International Economic 
Relations under the PNDC, 1982-1992,” African Study Monograph, 20.2 (June 
1999): 73-98; Konado-Agyemang, “The Best of Times and the Worst of 
Times,” 469-483. 
6
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resulting in the implementation of the Programme of Action to 
Mitigate the Social Cost of Adjustment (PAMSCAD).21  
Following international pressure (mainly from the World Bank 
and the IMF) and domestic discontent from the implementation 
of SAP, the top hierarchy of the PNDC made a strategic choice 
in the late eighties to return the country to democracy by first 
lifting a ban on the activities of political parties.  While the 
decision to return the country to democracy was not voluntarily 
initiated by the ruling class, it nonetheless benefitted them since 
power was handed to Jerry John Rawlings again (this time as a 
civilian rather than a military leader).  O’Donnell and Schmitter’s 
argument that it is difficult to predict the outcome of democratic 
transitions since much depends on the short-time calculations 
and the immediate reaction of strategic actors to the unfolding 
event seems very accurate in the Ghanaian case.22 The PNDC 
regime was able to calculate well by providing for themselves 
blanket amnesty for all the crimes they have committed under 
the military regime and formed a civilian party that allowed them 
to continue to stay in power for another eight years. 23  
  However, the incoming National Democratic Congress 
(NDC) (a vestige of the PNDC regime) did not deem it 
appropriate to investigate human rights violations that occurred 
before the transition to democracy. This was partly due to the 
fact that most of the human rights violations committed before 
the transition to democracy in 1992 was under the watch of the 
same leader, Jerry John Rawlings. Rather, the NDC government 
preferred an “opaque reconciliation agenda” that covered only 
“selective de-confiscation of properties illegally seized in the 
                                                 
21 Boafo-Arthur, “Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPS) in Ghana,” 1-
19;  Boafo-Arthur, “Ghana’s Politics of International Economic Relations 
under the PNDC, 1982-1992,” 73-98. 
22 O’Donnell, and Schmitter, “Transitions from Authoritarian Rule,” 456. 
23 K. Boafo-Arthur, “National Reconciliation or Polarisation: The Politics of 
the Ghana National Reconciliation Commission,” in The Crisis of State and 
Regionalism in West Africa: Identity, Citizenship and Conflict, eds. W.A. Fawole and 
C. Ukeje, (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2005). 
7
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previous Rawlings-led regimes.”24  The NDC preference for an 
“opaque” reconciliation agenda rather than a comprehensive 
reconciliation process using a TRC was informed by the 
constant anxiety among the rank of the NDC that such an 
exercise will deliberately harm them collectively or individually.25 
 The New Patriotic Party (NPP), an arch-rival and also 
victim of the Rawlings-led military regimes, opted for a truth 
commission after winning the 2000 election. Indeed, Gyimah-
Boadi argues that the decision to establish a truth commission 
was a political manifesto of the NPP on which they campaigned 
widely. 26  Although it was a campaign promise of the NPP to 
establish a truth commission, it was not however the intention 
of the party to protect Rawlings from accountability – at least 
not of the decisions he made as both chairman of the AFRC and 
the PNDC, which led to several human rights violations. The 
period after the political transition till the time the NRC was 
established can be aptly captured by Ní Aoláin and Campbell 
categorization of political transitions.27  They distinguish 
between two types of political transitions after violent conflicts 
and political repressions: “paradigmatic” and “conflicted 
democracies.” The paradigmatic transition involves the 
aspiration and attempts of non-democratic states to practice 
democracy after violent conflict or rule by an “illegitimate” 
government. The state practices what Ní Aoláin and Campbell 
call “procedural” democracy. This meets only the “minimal 
requirements” needed for a state to become democratic. For 
example, paradigmatic democratic states may aspire to have a 
majoritarian rule by holding regular elections, which although 
not necessarily fair or transparent might just conform to the 
norm of engaging in a form of democratic process. In 
paradigmatic transitions, therefore, the state in question emerges 
                                                 
24 Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi, “National Reconciliation in Ghana: Prospects 
and Challenges,” CDD-Ghana Briefing Paper, 4.1 (2002): 2. 
25 Ibid., 3. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ní Aoláin and Campbell, “The Paradox of Transition in Conflicted 
Democracies,” 172-213. 
8
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from a repressive past or a destructive conflict, where 
democracy was never practiced or could not have been 
operational, to a procedural democracy. 
 Conflicted democratic transition, on the other hand, 
involves the efforts of states to move from the minimal form of 
democracy that characterized the pre-transition period to a more 
advanced level of democracy after the transition. Such states 
practice “substantive” democracy, which goes beyond the 
holding of only regular elections (which at times may not be free 
and fair). Substantive democracy encompasses free and 
transparent elections, and the provision of requisite democratic 
institutions such as the legislature, executive, judiciary, free press 
and vibrant civil society needed to sustain the process. Therefore 
in conflicted democratic transition, the country in question 
already practices a form of democracy by observing the ritual of 
holding regular elections though there may still remain firmly-
established divisions within the country in the form of racial, 
ethnic, religious, class or ideological struggles.  
 This distinction between the two types of transitions is 
very helpful in understanding Ghana’s transition and in 
particular why a transitional justice programme was necessary in 
the country. Arguably, the Ghanaian transition to the Fourth 
Republic is both paradigmatic and conflicted. Unlike others, the 
Ghanaian transition already had vibrant civil society 
organizations (CSOs) as well as strong state institutions in 
place.28  This was a result of the late start of the transitional 
justice program – almost a decade after the return to 
constitutional democracy from military rule.  Yet, there was 
some level of apathy and near confrontationist attitude between 
the CSOs and state institutions regarding aspects of peace-
building. This conflict could be understood within the context 
of Bombande’s argument that governments regard civil society 
organizations as “competitors rather than collaborators” when it 
                                                 
28 A.F. Odora, “Rising from the Ashes: the Rebirth of Civil Society in an 
Authoritarian Political Environment,” International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law, 
10.3 (2008): 79-91. 
9
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comes to issues related to peacebuilding. 29  The major problem 
has to do with the process/manner of peace building. While 
politicians operating under the façade of the state seek quick  
“peace dividends”30 that “put them in good light in public 
opinion,”31 civil society organizations prefer a systematic, 
innovative and careful intervention that do not only address the 
issues at the heart of the problem but which will also forestall 
future repetitions. Also, having emerged from authoritarian rule, 
some new democratic states still retain the vestiges of patronage 
politics. In a situation of limited resources and the duplication of 
roles between the state and civil society organizations, 
governments can monopolize the former and stifle political 
opportunities to gain control over civil society groups. The 
consequence of such a situation is the limited roles that civil 
society groups choose to play at crucial periods in their 
developments and expansion. They tend to avoid human rights 
                                                 
29 E. Bombande, “Conflicts, Civil Society Organizations and Community 
Peacebuilding Practices in Northern Ghana,” in Ethnicity, Conflicts and 
Consensus in Ghana, ed. S. Tonah, (Accra: Woeli Publishing Services, 2007), 
221.  This assertion stems from the frustration the Inter-NGO Consortium—
a group of several local and international peace building and other civil 
society organizations—encountered in their attempt to help at peace building 
efforts in Northern Ghana at the height of the “guinea fowl” war in 1994.  
See Bombande, “Conflicts, Civil Society Organizations and Community 
Peacebuilding Practices in Northern Ghana,” 221. 
30 “Peace Dividends” refers to the tendency or desire to rapidly show 
progress or successes vis à vis security and relief work in fragile and conflict-
affected situations which has a tendency to patch over deep-seated 
problems. For more discussion on this issue see M.A. Rocha, “’State-
building for Peace’: Navigating an Arena of Contradictions,” Overseas 
Development Studies Briefing Paper, No. 52 (London: Overseas 
Development Institute, August 2009).  See also Roland Paris and T. Sisk, 
Dilemmas of State-Building: Confronting the Contradiction of Post-War Peace 
Operations (London: Routledge, 2009). 
31 Bombande, “Conflicts, Civil Society Organizations and Community 
Peacebuilding Practices in Northern Ghana,” 221. 
10
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and democratic issues and focus on issues related to welfare and 
the provision of services.32 
 Ní Aoláin and Campbell note that in a paradigmatic 
transition, the state engages with the legacy of the previous 
regimes’ massive human rights violations.33  As mentioned 
earlier, the military has intermittently interrupted the Ghanaian 
democratic dispensation on four occasions, all of which were 
characterized by widespread violations of human rights. Though 
the Commission found that overall trend of human rights 
violations spread across both constitutional and unconstitutional 
governments,34 the coming to power of military regimes were 
marked by sharp rises in human rights violations. Specifically, 
the periods under the AFRC and the PNDC witnessed 
particularly extensive use of repressive measures.35 Under these 
two regimes, abductions and torture were very common. So 
were “disappearances” and the use of “kangaroo courts” to 
expedite death sentences on the regime’s “enemies.” There were 
many occasions under the PNDC when market women were 
publicly flogged by the military for the minimal crime of selling 
commodities at prices that were thought to be greater than the 
regime’s controlled prices. The unrestrained behaviour of the 
military further led to the infamous “house cleaning” campaign 
in which three High Court Judges, two former Heads of State 
and many citizens were arrested and subsequently murdered. 36  
These arrests and murders developed into a “culture of silence” 
in which people were afraid to criticize the policies and excesses 
of the PNDC regime.    
                                                 
32 Odora, “Rising from the Ashes: the Rebirth of Civil Society in an 
Authoritarian Political Environment,” 79 – 91. 
33 Ní Aoláin and Campbell, “The Paradox of Transition in Conflicted 
Democracies,” 172-213. 
34 Report of the National Reconciliation Commission, Vol.3, Chapter 3, 
(2004), 168. 
35 Ibid., 170.  
36 The “house cleaning” campaign referred to a time when the abduction and 
disappearance of people who were thought to be enemies of the regime 
became common. 
11
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Several reasons explain the astronomic rise of human rights 
violations committed under the AFRC and PNDC regimes 
(which together constitute 84% of all violations committed 
under the Commission’s mandate period).37 The report of the 
Commission notes that the record of high incidence of human 
rights violations under the AFRC and the PNDC could have 
been influenced by the fact that majority of witnesses who 
testified before the Commissions were victims of those regimes 
since they were the last military governments in the country 
before its return to constitutional rule. It may also have been 
that victims of some of the oldest governments in the country 
were no more available to testify against those regimes as a result 
of loss of lives or memory lapses.38 Despite the reasons that 
influenced human rights violations under these two regimes, the 
Commission finds (and as indicated in Figure 1) that majority of 
violations occurred under the PNDC. It started rising from 1981 
when the regime came to power and reached its peak in 1982 
when it struggled to consolidate its grips to power in the face of 
threats to its rule.  
                                                 
37 Report of the National Reconciliation Commission, Vol. 3, Chapter 3, 
(2004), 170. 
38 Ibid., 151. 
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Figure 1:  
Patterns of human rights violations in Ghana (1957- 1993)  
(Source: Report of the National Reconciliation Commission, 
October 2004) 
 
Therefore, it is right to argue that while Ghana has been a 
democratic state since independence, the period between 1979 
to 1992 was characterized by political repression and the 
suppression of the people’s freedom to speech and associational 
life.39  Such a situation, especially under a military government, 
makes it difficult to practice even the procedural form of 
democracy. Under constitutional rule, mass human rights 
violations are likely to attract wide condemnation from human 
rights groups and other civic organization within the state and 
may lead to dwindling electoral fortunes. However, under 
military regimes, it may be dangerous to openly display outrage 
or condemn such abuses because of the suppression of dissent 
and also the consequences of taking such a decision. On this 
basis, the Ghanaian transition to the Fourth Republic could 
arguably be classified as paradigmatic. 
 Perhaps more controversial, however, is the definition 
of Ghana as a conflicted democracy. The controversy does not 
                                                 
39 M. Ocquaye, “Human Rights and the Transition to Democracy under the 
PNDC in Ghana,” Human Rights Quarterly 17.3 (1995): 556. 
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lie in the fact that the country is plagued with “deep social 
cleavages, rancour and bitterness” which could easily be 
identified as conflictual, but in the assumption that Ghana is a 
“procedural” and not a “substantive” democracy following the 
transition in 1993 and before the commencement of the 
transitional justice programme in 2002.40  The country had 
established all the relevant democratic institutions needed to 
qualify it as substantive. It had a hierarchical court structure, a 
vibrant parliament, active civil society organizations, horizontal 
institutions of accountability such as the Commission on 
Human Rights and Administrative Justice and the National 
Commission for Civic Education among others. Ghana had 
also conducted regular elections mostly adjudged as being free 
and fair by both local and foreign observers  and, has in the 
past decade, also witnessed the alternation of power between 
governing and opposition political parties. Notwithstanding all 
these, however, Ní Aoláin and Campbell argue that Ghana, like 
many other conflicted democracies, already has some kind of 
“...ideological commitment to, and therefore claims adherence 
to, ‘democratic values’.”41 Therefore, the “self-definition” of 
being a democracy and the “commitment” to democratic tenets 
paradoxically makes transitional justice programmes in such 
countries seem irrelevant. However, Ghana’s “self-definition” 
of being a democratic state could not hide the “deep-seated” 
divisions42 the country faced, nor could it wipe clean its legacy 
                                                 
40 J.R.A. Ayee, “Political Leadership and Democratic Consolidation,” in 
Voting for Democracy in Ghana: The 2004 Elections in Perspective, ed. K. Boafo-
Arthur, Thematic Studies, Vol. 1 (Accra: Freedom Publications, 2006), 84. 
41 Ní Aoláin and Campbell, “The Paradox of Transition in Conflicted 
Democracies,” 174. 
42 These divisions take the form of political antagonism between the 
National Democratic Congress and the New Patriotic Party; inter and intra-
ethnic as well as chieftaincy tensions especially in the three Northern parts 
of the country, and religious tensions. For a detailed analysis of these 
tensions, see D. Tsikata and W. Seini, “Identities, Inequalities and Conflicts 
in Ghana,” Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and 
Ethnicity (CRISE), Working Paper No. 5 (Oxford, November 2004). 
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of past human right violations. The NRC was essentially 
established to address this situation. 
 
The National Reconciliation Commission  
Many transitional justice analysts argue that coming to terms 
with the past after gross human rights violations is an essential 
part of the process of social, legal and moral reconstruction of a 
society.43 It is a common feature during transitions to establish 
officially sanctioned bodies to investigate and document 
patterns of human rights violations in the past and also to make 
recommendations on how similar abuses can be prevented in 
future.44 While truth commissions are not substitutes for other 
forms of accountability, they nonetheless are essentially 
                                                 
43 Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “Civil Society in Process of Accountability,” in Post-
Conflict Justice, ed. M. Cheriff Bassiouni (New York: Transnational Publishers, 
2002); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “State Responsibility to Investigate and 
Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations in International Law,” California 
Law Review 78.2 (1990): 449; Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000); Ruti Teitel, “Transitional Jurisprudence,” The Yale 
Law Journal 106.7 (1997); Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: 
Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998); 
Nigel Biggar, , ed. Burying the Past: Making Peace and Doing Justice after Civil 
Conflict (Georgetown University Press , 2001).  In fact, the literature abounds 
with such arguments. See also Carlos S. Nino, “The Duty to Punish Past 
Abuses of Human Rights Put into Context: The Case of Argentina,” Yale Law 
Journal 100 (1991): 2619; Diane F. Orentlicher, “Settling Accounts: The Duty 
to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime,” Yale Law Journal 
100 (1991): 25-37; Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle 
for Global Justice, rev. and exp. ed. (New York: The New Press, 2002); and 
Nicholas Tavuchis, Mea Culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991).  
44 Priscilla Hayner, “Fifteen Truth Commissions:  A Comparative 
tudy,” Human Rights Quarterly, 16.4 (1994): 597-655; Priscilla Hayner, 
“Commissioning the Truth: Further Research Question,” Third World 
Quarterly, 17.1 (1996): 19-29; Priscilla Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: 
Confronting State Terror and Atrocity (New York: Routledge, 2004); 
Priscilla Hayner, ‘Truth Commissions: A Schematic Review,” 
International Review of the Red Cross, 862 (2006): 295-360. 
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complementary measures of same.45  The relationship between 
the Sierra Leonean TRC and Special Court offers a classic 
instance. Even though there were documented instances of 
tension in the working relationship between these transitional 
justice processes, it nonetheless proved that these two 
accountability mechanisms can operate side-by-side. Truth 
Commissions are generally understood as “non-judicial or 
quasi-judicial investigative bodies, which map patterns of past 
violence, and unearth the causes and consequences of these 
destructive events.”46  These bodies have gained much currency 
as influential policy tools for national healing after armed 
conflict and following the end of brutal and repressive regimes 
given the relative success of the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. Truth Commissions are not the 
same everywhere, given that they are set up because of different 
precipitating factors including the end of repressive regimes, 
entrenched structural segregation and after violent armed 
conflict. They can also differ with regards to the sponsor of the 
Commission which could be the national government of the 
country concerned, the United Nations or non-governmental 
organizations. Finally, Truth Commissions’ source of authority 
                                                 
45  For a detailed analysis of this relationship see Marieka Wierda, Priscilla 
Hayner, and Paul van Zyl, “Exploring the Relationship between the Special 
Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone,” rev. 
24 June 2002, original paper presented to the “UN Expert Group on the 
Relationship between the TRC and the Special Court,” New York, December 
20-21, 2001. See also William Schabas, “A Synergistic Relationship: The 
Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone,” Criminal Law Forum, 15.1-2 (2004): 3-54; William Schabas, 
“The Relationship Between Truth Commissions and International Courts: 
The Case of Sierra Leone,” Human Rights Quarterly 25.4 (2003): 1035-1066; 
and, Suzannah Linton “Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra Leone: 
Experiments in International Justice,” Criminal Law Forum 12.2 (2001):  185-
246.   
46 United Nations “United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice,”  
Guidance Notes of the Secretary-General, March 2010:8 accessed at 
http://www.unrol.org/files/TJ_Guidance_Note_March_2010FINAL.pdf,on 
13/08/2011 and Priscilla Hayner’s “Fifteen Truth Commissions” and 
Unspeakable Truths give a good definition of TRCs.   
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could be a distinguishing factor since some derive their 
legitimacy from legal and/or political power of subpoena, yet 
others permit voluntary cooperation from participants.47  
 The mandate of the Ghanaian National Reconciliation 
Commission was to “…seek and promote reconciliation among 
the people of Ghana”48 and to “make recommendations to the 
President for redress.”49 Specifically, Section 4 (a-e) of Act 611 
empowers the Commission to:  
• Investigate human rights abuses related to killings, 
abductions, disappearances, detentions, torture, ill-
treatment and seizure of properties during past military 
regimes in Ghana; 
• Investigate the causes and contexts within which those 
abuses occurred; 
• Identify perpetrators and victims of such abuses; 
• Make appropriate recommendations for redressing such 
abuses; and, 
• Make the work of the Commission a source of public 
education. 
 
This TRC process was necessary in the Ghanaian context 
because there were a lot of deceit and negation concerning 
human rights violations – especially with regard to cases relating 
to abduction and disappearances.50  Ghana’s political history, 
especially the part that has to do with violence and human rights 
violations, vary depending on the political leanings (whether 
NPP or NDC) of the narrator. Thus, while members of the 
NPP generally think the 1966 military coup d’état that toppled 
Ghana’s first president was legal but the coups d’état staged by 
                                                 
47 Hayner, “Fifteen Truth Commissions,” 597-655; Hayner, Unspeakable 
Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity.  
48 Republic of Ghana National Reconciliation Commission Act (Act 611) (2001), 
Sec. 3.1. 
49 Ibid., Sec. 3.1.b.  
50 The abduction and subsequent murder of the three High Court judges, 
which became the central issue during the work of the NRC, is a case in 
point. 
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military strongman JJ Rawlings in 1979 and 1981 were illegal, 
members of the NDC see it the other way round.51  A 
consequence of the different perceptions of violence in the 
country was the great controversy generated by the creation of 
the National Reconciliation Commission in 2001; especially 
volatile was which period in the country’s history should be 
investigated by the Commission.52 Thus, the political posturing 
of the NDC and the NPP in the Ghanaian Parliament during the 
debate of the National Reconciliation Commission Bill  was not 
only a reflection of a long-held belief by the two dominant 
political traditions in the country but also a rehearsal of the sort 
of politicization that will characterize the Commission’s work. 
As noted by Ignatieff, truth commissions have the potential to 
limit the number of truths circulated unchallenged in the 
political and historical discourse of a country.53  However, in the 
Ghanaian case, the nature of political tensions between the two 
main political parties in the country made it little less impossible 
to agree on a shared truth about the history of human rights 
violations.54 However, paramount to all these, is the 
demonstration of political leadership on the part of the NPP 
administration regarding national reconciliation. One of the key 
points in the NPP’s manifesto going into the 2000 general 
election was to set up a reconciliation commission to unearth 
                                                 
51 Dennis Austin, Politics in Ghana: 1946-1966 (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1964); G. Bing, Reap the Whirlwind: An account of Kwame Nkrumah’s 
Ghana: 1950-1966 (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1968).  
52 Robert Ameh, “Uncovering Truth: Ghana’s National Reconciliation 
Commission Excavation of Past Human Rights Abuses,” Contemporary Justice 
Review 9.4 (2006): 345-368; and Robert Ameh, “Doing Justice after Conflict: 
The Case for Ghana’s National Reconciliation Commission,” Canadian Journal 
of Law and Society, 21.1. (2006): 85-109. 
53 Michael Ignatieff, “Articles of Faith,” Index on Censorship, 25.5 
(September/October 1996): 110-122.   
54 See, for example, Austin, Politics in Ghana: 1946-1966 and Bing, Reap the 
Whirlwind: An account of Kwame Nkrumah’s Ghana 1950-1966. See also Ameh, 
“Uncovering Truth,” and Ameh, “Doing Justice after Conflict,” for a 
discussion of some of these controversies and the political contexts that 
generated them. 
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past atrocities; so once they won the election, they did not 
renege on their promise to the electorate.55 It was in the light of 
these and several other reasons that the Ghanaian truth 
commission was deemed to be necessary. 
 Though widely criticized for being over-politicized56 and 
even controversial,57 the Commission was able to achieve some 
of its objectives as mandated in Act 611. The report implicated 
the security institutions as the major perpetrators of human 
rights violations during the country’s troubled times; uncovered 
some graves and paid reparations to selected victims of human 
rights violations. The most valuable contribution of the 
Commission towards reconciliation in the country, according to 
some victims interviewed, was the cathartic experience they 
went through after being given the opportunity to ventilate their 
grievances on such a public platform. These achievements were 
widely propagated by an active media and other civil society 
organizations. The section that follows discusses the extent to 
which Ghanaian civic groups participated in the Commission’s 
process. 
 
Civil Society Organizations 
Variously known as “non-governmental organizations”, “social 
movements”, and “citizen action” or “advocacy networks”, civil 
society organizations have been defined by Marlies Glasius58 as a 
deliberate get-together of people with the aim of influencing 
their society. Glasius identifies three main functions of civil 
society organizations: (i) paradigm-shifters who influence people 
                                                 
55 New Patriotic Party Manifesto (2000), 37. 
56 S. Alidu, G. Fairbairnand D. Webb, “‘Truths’ and ‘Re-Imaging’ in the 
Reconciliation Process,” Peace Review, 21.2 (2009: 136- 143; Boafo-Arthur, 
“The Quest for National Reconciliation in Ghana,” 127-155; Nahla Valji, 
“Ghana’s National Reconciliation Commission: A Comparative Assessment,” 
New York: International Center for Transitional Justice Occasional Paper 
Series (2006). 
57 Ayee, “Political Leadership and Democratic Consolidation,” 79-99. 
58 Marlies Glasius, “Global Civil Society and Human Rights,” in Human 
Rights: Politics and Practice, ed.  Michael Goodhart (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 149. 
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to shift their minds and beliefs; (ii) law-making: persuading and 
lobbying law-makers at both the domestic and international 
levels to make laws favourable to the causes they champion; and, 
(iii) human rights monitors who have the will and courage to 
fight for the implementation of laws and policies where 
governments and policy-makers fail.59  
 McConnachie60 has identified the following roles that 
civil society organizations can play during transitions: in the 
drafting of legislations for truth commissions and also lobbying 
to improve them; convening national discussions on 
international best practices within the field of transitional justice; 
holding preparatory conferences and also training the media on 
the coverage of the accountability process; and researching 
alternative models for reconciliation. Similarly, Roht-Arriaza has 
highlighted the following as “points of intervention” for civil 
society organizations during transitions: in the overall design of 
accountability measures including aspects of reparations; in the 
naming of punishable crimes and the type of sanctions to be 
used, and in the obtaining of witnesses.61  Each of these roles 
should be performed within the authority of the constitution of 
the state in question and according to the principles and spirit of 
international law. This may seem like subjugating civil society 
organizations to the mercy of the state. Yet, each of these 
groups – state and civil society – has roles they can play best 
notwithstanding the relatively ‘symmetric’ power relations 
between them. Further, Marlies Glasius62 has rightly pointed out 
that the relationship between civil society organisations could be 
conflictual as conflict arises between the aims and mode of 
operation of different CSOs. Hence, it sometimes makes sense 
for national laws to circumscribe the functions of CSOs. 
 
                                                 
59 Ibid. 
60 Kristen McConnachie, “Truth Commissions and NGOs: the Essential 
Relationship,” International Center for Transitional Justice and CDD-Ghana 
Occasional Paper Series (April 2004). 
61 Roht-Arriaza, “Civil Society in Process of Accountability,” 97–114. 
62 Glasius, “Global Civil Society and Human Rights,” 147-163. 
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The CDD and the Civil Society Coalition on National 
Reconciliation 
The Ghana Centre for Democratic Governance (CDD) assumed 
a lead-role in mobilising other non-state actors to influence the 
work of the Commission. The CDD is an autonomous, non-
political and not-for-profit research, advocacy and research-
based think-tank in Accra-Ghana. Established in 1998, it is 
dedicated to the promotion of democracy, good governance and 
the development of a liberal political and economic environment 
in Ghana and the African continent at large. Since its 
establishment, the CDD has engaged in a number of activities 
related to governance, peace and security, and human rights, 
among others.63  Many of the Centre’s capacity building projects 
can be classified broadly under the banner of peace building, 
including civil-military relations, land conflict management and 
issues related to security and crime.64  It also focuses on issues 
related to good governance, free and fair election, and matters 
that border on improving civil society capabilities and/or its 
relations with government.65 Based on these objectives, the 
                                                 
63 “Services: Training/Capacity-Building,” CDD-Ghana; available from 
 http://www.cddghana.org/service.asp?cnid=15; accessed 10 Feb. 2011. 
64 Ibid. For example, in 2000, the Centre organised a workshop with 
representatives from the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative 
Justice (CHRAJ), the Ghana Bar Association, African Security Dialogue and 
Research and commanders from the Ghana Armed Forces to review a draft 
report on “Civil-Military Relations in Ghana.” Similar fora have been held to 
facilitate dialogue between the military and civil society relations in the 
country; peace building and conflict management (as exemplified by the 
1998 seminar on “Conflict and Conflict Management in Africa” facilitated 
by Professor Donald Rothchild of the University of California); the role of 
civil society in conflict resolution and reconciliation (as per the one 
organised for members of the GHANEPO on “Conflict, Peace and 
Reconciliation”); issues related to crime and  security ( as demonstrated by 
the seminar on “Crime and Security in West Africa Sub-region) that brought 
together security experts from Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Togo.  
65 Ibid. Cases in point include workshops and trainings organised for these 
bodies on several occasions. For example in 2000 the Centre organised a 
workshop on “Strengthening Civil Society Advocacy in Expenditure 
Monitoring” in an attempt to bring together civil society closer to 
21
Alidu and Ame: Civil Society Activism and the Ghanaian National Reconciliation Commission
Published by Scholarship@Western, 2013
  
 
 
 
 
125  Civil Society and the Ghanaian National Reconciliation Commission 
 
 
Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.1, 2012, 104-136 
CDD brought other civil society organizations to form the Civil 
Society Coalition on National Reconciliation in March 2001.  
The Coalition developed a national transitional justice 
framework in three main areas: conceptualization of national 
reconciliation, public and legislative consultations, and public 
space.66 
 
Conceptualization of National Reconciliation 
The CDD in conjunction with the Coalition conducted a 
nationwide survey67 on the opinions of the public about a 
prospective reconciliation commission in the country. The 
results of the survey indicated an overwhelming support among 
Ghanaians (89% of respondents) for such an exercise. This 
indication from the public led the CDD and the Coalition to 
organize a national conference, followed by a series of focus 
groups in the Northern, Ashanti, Brong Ahafo and Volta 
regions in the country to discuss ways in which such a 
Commission could productively function.68 The result of these 
                                                                                                      
government’s day to day policy making.  Members who attended the 
seminar were CIVICSOC/SAPRI and the Parliamentary Finance 
Committee. 
66 Franklin Oduro, “NGO Relationship with Truth Commission in Ghana,” 
in Kristen McConnachie, “Truth Commissions and NGOs: the Essential 
Relationship,” International Center for Transitional Justice and CDD-Ghana 
Occasional Paper Series (April 2004). 
67 CDD-Ghana, “Public Opinion on National Reconciliation in Ghana: 
Survey Evidence,” Research Paper No. 10 (2001). The survey captured the 
views of 1000 Ghanaian between 25 years and over in all the ten regions of 
the country in May 2001 about their attitude and opinions towards national 
reconciliation and perceptions of human rights abuses of past governments 
from 1957-2000. 
68 The theme for the conference was “National Reconciliation: International 
Perspectives” and was aimed at encouraging discussion on the Ghanaian 
reconciliation process. Among those who attended were Dr. Alex Boraine, 
then Deputy Chair of the South African TRC and later President of the 
International Center for Transitional Justice; Priscilla B. Hayner from the 
International Center for Transitional Justice; then-Attorney General and 
Minster of Justice in Ghana, Mr. Nana  Akufo-Addo; then-Speaker of the 
Ghanaian Parliament, Rt. Hon. Peter Ala Adjettey; then-Chief Justice of 
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events was the drafting of a twelve-point declaration that 
outlined how the government should proceed with its plans of 
national reconciliation and which also formed the basis of the 
legislation that eventually gave birth to the Commission.69 
 
Law-making and Advocacy Role 
In partnership with the Parliamentary Committee on 
Constitutional, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, the Coalition 
organized an international conference on the “Technical Review 
of the National Reconciliation Bill” at Elmina in the Central 
region to critically review the draft Bill of the NRC and also to 
recommend, where necessary, modifications and additions to the 
Bill before its Second Reading in parliament.70 Participants to 
this conference included Parliamentarians from the Ghanaian 
Parliament, members of the Council of State and civil society 
organizations. Also, representatives from the International 
Centre for Transitional Justice collaborated with local experts to 
help in reviewing the Bill. The review process was followed by a 
nation-wide consultations and information campaign that saw 
the publication of the Commission’s draft legislation in major 
newspapers in the country.  Following the passage of the 
National Reconciliation Commission Bill into an Act, the 
Coalition organized series of workshops for media practitioners 
on how to productively cover the proceedings of the 
Commission. Experts to these workshops were invited from 
South Africa, Nigeria, England, and the USA.71  These 
workshops were followed by an aggressive nationwide publicity 
campaign through television and radio talk shows, dramas, and 
public forums to raise awareness and encourage discussion and 
understanding among citizens. Also, abridged versions of the 
National Reconciliation Act were also printed and widely 
                                                                                                      
Ghana, Justice E.K. Wiredu; national political parties, opinion and religious 
leaders and members of the civil society. 
69 Oduro, “NGO Relationship with Truth Commission in Ghana.” 
70 CDD-Ghana, “NRC: Matters Arising,” in Democracy Watch, 4.1 
(March 2003): 1-5. 
71 Ibid. 
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distributed. The Coalition also embarked on a “nation-wide 
mopping exercise” after the closure of the Commission’s Zonal 
Offices throughout the country, to give chance to victims who 
still wanted to petition the Commission to do so.72  
 In this way, the CDD also provided a platform for civil 
society discussions. This platform, in addition to the focus group 
discussions organized earlier, provided Ghanaians an 
opportunity to openly express their opinions on a very 
important national exercise and also created a modern direct 
democracy that bridged the wide gap between members of the 
civil society and government. The CDD notes that members of 
the Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional and Legal affairs 
and other parliamentarians led discussions on national 
reconciliation at the above forums and an average of 300 
participants mainly from civil society groups and the general 
public attended.73 
  
Provision of Expertise and Training for members of CSOs 
The media—the Ghana Journalist Association—was part of the 
civil society organizations that formed the Civil Society Coalition 
on National Reconciliation in Ghana. As part of the Coalition, 
journalists were not only trained on how to report issues of 
human rights violations but also how to do that ethically. A code 
of conduct—which became known as the “Spirit of 
Akosombo”—was developed to help journalist report the 
Commission’s process in an ethical manner. The “Spirit of 
Akosombo”, as noted by  Sarpong, was adopted by  the 
National Consultative Committee of the Ghana Journalists’ 
Association, following fears that unregulated coverage of the 
Commission’s proceedings could be more “divisive and 
potentially deepen conflict” at the communal and national 
                                                 
72 K. Appiagyei-Atia, K. “Ghana: the Road to Peaceful Co-existence and 
Reconciliation,” Transitional Justice Monitor, 1.2 (2008): 4-6. 
73 CDD-Ghana, “NRC: Matters Arising.” 
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levels.74  In a cautionary fashion, the code addresses some prime 
aspects of the relationship between the media and the work of 
the Commission including reporting of proceedings, the target 
audiences and roles and attitude of the press during the work of 
the Commission.75 Thus, the CDD helped circumscribe the 
parameters of media reporting during the reconciliation process 
in the country.  
 This is indeed an applauded role of paradigm-shifting 
except the little challenges that the Coalition encountered with 
media reporting of the event afterwards. The main concern of 
the Coalition as far as the media was concerned  was 
irresponsible reportage and therefore concentrated on 
promoting an “ethical media behaviour” and not substantial 
media coverage of the proceedings.76 This action was based on 
the assumption that the Commission’s work will self-generate 
media interest and trigger extensive coverage. the National 
Media Commission, however, later realized that the media was 
not as interested in the Commission’s proceedings as they 
initially assumed and had to quickly work with the Coalition and  
the Ghana Journalist Association to lobby media managers and 
editors to take on board pertinent issues arising from the work 
of the Commission.77 
 However, this did not bring to an end the challenges 
encountered by the Coalition in relation to media reportage of 
the Commission’s proceedings. The media was perceived, in 
many regards, as a pawn in a politically-charged reconciliation 
process. As a result, some media houses were suspected to be 
influenced politically, to report the work of the Commission in a 
                                                 
74 George Sarpong, “NGOs, Media and Truth Commissions: the Ghanaian 
Experience,” in Kristen McConnachie, “Truth Commissions and NGOs: the 
Essential Relationship,” International Center for Transitional Justice and 
CDD-Ghana Occasional Paper Series (April 2004), 22. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
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manner that favoured their partisan leanings.78 Valji points out 
that some newspapers selected stories from the Commission 
that either added to the political capital of their parties or were 
very damaging to rival political parties. 79 The politicization of 
the reportage of the Commission’s hearings took away the 
important lessons that the citizens were supposed to learn from 
the work of the Commission and rather heightened the 
accusations that the establishment of the Commission was 
politically motivated.80 This did not only breach the “Spirit of 
Akosombo” but also undermined the credibility of the media as 
an independent democratic institution. 
 
Assessment of the Civil Society Coalition on National 
Reconciliation 
Undoubtedly, the work of the Coalition brought policy making 
to the door steps of average Ghanaians whose representatives in 
parliament took a rather partisan approach to this important 
national exercise. By engaging the public to contribute to the 
direction of the reconciliation process, it became more 
participatory and people-centred. The then programs officer in-
charge of the transitional justice unit at CDD, Abigail Gyimah 
notes that the Coalition was a “useful conduit for the exchange 
of information instrumental in articulating, on one hand, public 
sentiments and perceptions on the Commission’s performance 
                                                 
78 This partisan influence also motivated the alleged act of some employees 
of the Commission leaking damaging stories to newspapers sympathetic to 
their parties. The CDD (2004) condemned the leaking of sections of the 
final report, which were very damaging to both the then-opposition NDC 
and the PNDC, to pro-government newspapers. See CDD-Ghana, “NRC 
Report Leakage: Reparation and the Way Forward,” Democracy Watch, 5.4 
(December 2004): 11. 
79 Valji, “Ghana’s National Reconciliation Commission: A Comparative 
Assessment.” 
80 Valji notes that the work of the Commission was plagued with accusations 
of bias in the way witnesses perceived to be pro-Rawlings or PNDC were 
treated. She further notes that the chairman of the Commission, Justice 
Kweku Etrew Amua-Sekyi was in particular alleged to have put up this 
behaviour. 
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to the Commission; and, on the other hand, enlisting public 
support for the Commission by fostering a wider societal 
appreciation of the Commission’s enabling statute, its work and 
the challenges and prospects it faced.”81  This two-way flow of 
information created consensus and unity of purpose between the 
Commission and Ghanaian civic groups which was lacking 
among the country’s political elite.  
 It is important to state that though the CDD-led 
Coalition on National Reconciliation did a great job, the 
political-leaning of the CDD has been questioned. For example, 
Frank Ohemeng points out that two executive members of the 
CDD are card-bearing members of the New Patriotic Party and 
thus their political neutrality as a think-tank cannot be 
guaranteed. 82 Arguably, having two executive members of the 
organization as card bearing members of a political party is not a 
problem since they can clearly demonstrate impartiality as far as 
their responsibility towards reconciliation in the country is 
concern. Yet, a lot of concerns were raised regarding this. For 
example, it was believed that since the NDC was not interested 
in establishing a TRC (one of the reasons for the delay in 
starting the reconciliation process in Ghana as stated earlier) but 
the NPP did, it stands to reason that the enormous support that 
CDD gave to the creation and work of the NRC was mainly 
because of their political support for the NPP. The NPP 
government of the time initially wanted only military regimes 
(except that of 1966, which the NPP supported) to be 
investigated by the NRC and not civilian regimes (which would 
have included previous NPP governments) even though it is 
generally agreed that human rights violations have been 
committed by both civilian and military regimes in Ghana. 
Ameh has discussed the “door of hope” versus the “window of 
opportunity” debate that resulted from this stance of the then 
                                                 
81 Interview with Abigail Gyimah, former program officer in charge of the 
transitional justice unit, at the CDD in Accra, Ghana on 10 Feb. 2008. 
82 Frank Ohemeng, “Getting the state right: think tanks and the 
dissemination of New Public Management ideas in Ghana,” Journal of Modern 
Africa Studies, 43.3 (2005): 443-465.  
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ruling NPP government.83  In the end, the position of the 
government left many wondering if the NRC was only created 
to witch-hunt functionaries of their rival NDC party.84  
Understandably, the consequence was that many pro-NDC civil 
society groups and individuals were unwilling to be part of the 
Coalition and did not lend support to its work either nor that of 
the NRC.  Therefore, any further review of the Coalition’s role 
in the National Reconciliation Commission must contend with 
this perceived bias.   
 Further, despite the large representation shown by civil 
society groups in the Ghanaian transition process, there was, 
however, no identifiable women group among the Coalition or 
outside of it that represented their interest.  Like many 
transitional justice processes,85  the Ghanaian one was gender 
supportive in both its design and public hearings. Among the 
Commissioners were three respectable women: Professor 
H.J.A.N. Mensa-Bonsu, law professor at the University of 
Ghana; Professor Abena Dolphyne, former Pro Vice-Chancellor 
of the University of Ghana; and Dr. Sylvia Boye, an educator at 
the West African Examination Council. Another woman who 
held a high position within the NRC was Dr. Araba Sefa-Dede, a 
Professor of psychology at the University of Ghana Medical 
School, who led the Counselling Unit and was supported by 
other female staff. This is very significant given that women 
have mainly been excluded from decision making process in the 
                                                 
83 Ameh, “Uncovering Truth: Ghana’s National Reconciliation Commission 
Excavation of Past Human Rights Abuses,” 345-368. 
84 Seidu Alidu, “The NRC and Reconciliation in Ghana: an Assessment,” The 
Review of International Affairs 1138-1139.LXI (2010): 153-177; Ayee, “Political 
Leadership and Democratic Consolidation,” 79-99. 
85 See the cases of South Africa, Peru and Sierra Leone which widely 
incorporated gender perspectives into the work of their Commissions 
through a gender-based analysis of human rights violations and a 
recommendation for an engendered reparation programmes. For a detailed 
analysis of these TRCs, See The World Bank (2006) Gender, Justice and 
Truth Commissions, New York. 
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country from the informal household/family level to the formal 
national policy making level.86  
 Even though this was designed to give confidence to 
female victims to come forward and petition the Commission 
and also discuss their problems with Commissioners and 
counsellors, it was also in tune with the United Nations Security 
Council resolution 1325 and related resolutions87 which called 
for an “increased women representation and participation in 
decision making processes that are aimed at preventing, 
managing and resolving conflicts.”88 However, the mere 
inclusion of women as Commissioners in the NRC does not 
necessarily guarantee that women’s grievances would be 
addressed. This requires strong women’s groups to lobby for it 
which unfortunately was missing.89 Mensa-Bonsu believes that 
the political tension surrounding the establishment and 
proceedings of the Commission as well as illiteracy among 
majority of women in the country could partially explain the lack 
of women lobby group during the NRC’s proceedings.90  
However, majority of women were part of the victim group that 
benefitted from the government’s reparation programme. If 
inadequate information  (about  the work of the Commission) 
could explain the general lack of participation from women 
groups in the Commission’s process, it is amazing how women 
                                                 
86 A.A. Apusigah, “Gender, Vulnerability and the Politics of Decision-making 
in Ghana: the case of the Upper East Region,” Ghana Journal of Development 
Studies 1.2 (2005): 6-25. 
87 See Resolutions 1820 passed in 2008, 1888 passed in 2009 and 1889 
passed in 2009. 
88 S/RES/1325 passed on 31 Oct. 2000. 
89 For example, during the Ugandan Juba peace negotiation process in 2006, 
the Ugandan Women’s Coalition for Peace was formed to “attain 
sustainable peace in Uganda” through acts of “lobbying” for women’s 
“inclusion” in all the five agenda items of the peace process. See A.M. 
Goetz, “Guidance Note: Identifying Women’s Peace and Security Priorities: 
Building Voice and Influence,” UNIFEM (2010). 
90 Mensa-Bonsu, “Gender, Justice and Reconciliation: Lessons from the 
Ghana’s NRC.” 
29
Alidu and Ame: Civil Society Activism and the Ghanaian National Reconciliation Commission
Published by Scholarship@Western, 2013
  
 
 
 
 
133  Civil Society and the Ghanaian National Reconciliation Commission 
 
 
Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.1, 2012, 104-136 
became so involved in the reparation stage of the Commission’s 
work.  
 What could be a  possible explanation, besides the 
politicization factor, is the general belief held by many victims 
that they have moved beyond the crimes committed against 
them and would not want to re-live those horrible experiences 
by participating in the Commission’s proceedings. This view 
reflects one of Ameh’s typologies of attitude of Ghanaians 
towards the establishment of a reconciliation commission in the 
country.91 Labelled as ‘passive’, this group of Ghanaians (made 
up of mainly victims of past human rights violations) admitted 
that the country has witnessed severe human rights violations.  
Yet, they do not support any form of formal investigation into 
such crimes. They believed such a task will only rake the old 
wounds of victims who have attempted to live above those 
crimes committed against them.  
 
Conclusion  
The Ghanaian TRC was a very unique one not only in the nature 
of the precipitating factors but also regarding the time taken to 
institute justice and accountability measures for victims. Yet, this 
delay suggests that it is not only in fragile states or those 
emerging from destructive violent armed conflicts that the TRC 
process is deemed to be necessary. It also  demonstrates that 
civil society groups can become a force to reckon with in 
periods of transitions when they  portray a unity of purpose and 
collaboratively work together through coalitions than each trying 
to single-handedly influence the work of the transition in line 
with its mandate – i.e., pro-rule of law, pro-democracy and pro-
gender. On the other hand, it also shows that coalitions of the 
nature formed in Ghana has the tendency of either limiting the 
number of civil society organizations that participate in the 
transitional processes or it may completely become ambitious 
                                                 
91 Ameh, “Doing Justice after Conflict: The Case for Ghana’s National 
Reconciliation Commission,” 85-109. 
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and perform tasks outside the original mandate of its coalition 
members. This may happen when such coalitions are not 
representatively done or where some civil society groups may be 
unwilling or unable to join such groups for whatever reason. 
 While the Commission has concluded its work, the 
country is still desperate to sustain what little reconciliation gains 
it made following the work of the Commission.  The numerous 
religious,92 political93 and ethnic94 conflicts still ongoing in the 
country cast a shadow of doubt on the achievements of the 
NRC and by implication, that of the Coalition.  Worst of all, civil 
society organisation think-tanks such as the CDD, the Institute 
for Economic Affairs (IEA) and IMANI are not helping matters 
by their perceived support for particular political parties even as 
they choose not to comment on actions and utterances of their 
favourite political parties that are perceived in negative light by 
the general public or even hide research findings that do not 
portray a positive image of their parties. Even as we conclude 
this paper, a huge controversy has erupted in the country about 
the neutrality of these think-tanks. It started with a Ghana News 
Agency (GNA) news item on the abuse of incumbency by the 
previous NPP government in the run-up to the 2008 general 
elections. According to the GNA, the source of the news item 
                                                 
92 These religious disputes have been recorded between intra-Muslim groups 
such as the Sunnis and the Ahmadiyya Muslim Mission; inter-religious such as 
those skirmishes between Christians and the Ga traditionalist over a ban on 
drumming. 
93 Political conflicts include those fought mainly between the New Patriotic 
Party and the National Democratic Congress across the length and breadth of 
the country and also within each of these political parties such as the agitation 
and acts of vandalism committed by NDC foot soldiers; and within the NPP 
is mainly between the Alan Kyeremanteng and Nana Akufo-Addo factions. 
94 These type of conflict also manifest in two different ways: inter –ethnic 
conflict such as those fought between the Kusasis and the Mamprusis, the 
Konkombas and the Nanumbas; and also at an intra-ethnic level such as 
those fought between the Abudu and the Andani royal gates to the Dagbon 
skin. 
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was a report posted on the website of the IEA.95  The IEA 
allegedly removed the report from its website and denied ever 
writing and posting such a report on its website.96  Yet the IEA 
indeed had posted the report on its website, although it was 
removed after the GNA news item was published.97 Clearly, the 
IEA did not want ordinary Ghanaians to be made aware of its 
negative research findings about the NPP government. 
Ironically, several days into the controversy, IEA announced its 
code of conduct for political parties during the up-coming 2012 
general elections.98 With its credibility deficit in the above case, 
one wonders if the IEA would be taken seriously by all political 
parties in the country.  
 The state has set up a National Peace Architecture, 
through the National Peace Council Act 2010, consisting of 
National, Regional and District levels Councils that will help 
prevent, manage and resolve religious, political and ethnic 
conflicts.  Since the Council has barely started its work, it may be 
too early to measure its impact. However, the establishment of 
such a structure almost seven years after the NRC has finished 
its work indicates that Ghana still needs some healing. 
                                                 
95 Ghana News Agency, “IEA Slams NPP for ‘Abuse’ of Incumbency in 
Election 2008,” Ghana Home Page, available from 
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?I
D=216387; accessed August 15, 2011. 
96 Citifmonline, ‘IEA Denies NPP Incumbency Abuse Story, Ghana Home 
Page, available from  http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/ 
NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=216436; accessed August 16, 2011. 
97 Ghana News Agency, “GNA Wins Credibility Battle with IEA: Truth 
Stands,” Ghana Home Page, available from http://www.ghanaweb.com/ 
GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=216546; accessed August 1 
7, 2011.  
98 Ghana News Agency, “IEA Reviews Code of Conduct Ahead of Election 
2012,” Ghana Home Page, available from http://www.ghanaweb.com/ 
GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=216860; accessed August 
22, 2011. 
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Reconciliation is both a process and a goal.99 Ghana has finished 
with the former; however, the latter is still in the works. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
99 D. Bloomfield, “On Good Terms: Clarifying Reconciliation,” The Berghof 
Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin, Report No. 
14 (2006). 
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